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Abstract   
Acid rain causes greater environmental damage than would occur if countries act 
cooperatively. Based on new estimates of sulphur abatement cost functions, the potential 
gains from cooperation are calculated for Europe.  Various cooperative abatement rates 
are compared with the rates implied by recent international agreements.  The distinction 
is made between primary and secondary abatement, and their respective roles are 
discussed.  
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1.  The search for agreement on acid rain policy 
In 1990, Britain's power plants and industrial boilers emitted 1,436 thousand tones of 
sulphur dioxide, of which 477 thousand tones fell as acid rain in Britain, and the rest fell on 
neighboring countries on the sea or is unidentified; and 543 thousand tones, emitted by its 
neighbors, fell on Britain [See EMEP, (6)].   In 1994, a £700m (US $1050m) enhancement of a 
single British power station (Drax) became operative, as part of a £8 billion programme with the 
objective of significantly reducing SO2 emissions by the year 2000.  In this paper we examine how 
much each country in Europe should spend for this purpose and in particular how much should be 
spent on cleaning up dirty emissions. 
The damage caused by Britain's emissions was borne both by the people of Britain and the 
other countries, each of which also spread SO2 on itself and its neighbors.  This is a classic instance 
of economic inefficiency, since policies to reduce emissions - abatement policies - will be operated 
at less than optimal levels because countries and, more narrowly, power generating companies, do 
not bear the full costs of the damage they themselves cause.  Economic theory can predict the 
"rational" level of abatement under a variety of assumptions, ranging from complete 
non-cooperation, through bargaining in the absence of sanctions or transfers, to the utopian cases of 
fully cooperative optimization at the regional or even world level.   
The recognition of these problems has led to political action in many countries on emission 
standards and other regulations.  The transboundary nature of the problem and the need for 
international coordinated policy measures have been recognized by the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, which was signed by 32 European countries (and the EEC), the 
USA and Canada. In 1985 a Protocol was added to the Convention committing signatories to reduce 
sulphur emissions by at least 30% by 1993 as compared with their 1980 emission levels (the "30% 
Club").  And in 1994, a "New Protocol" has been announced which modifies the 30% Club targets 
in a manner intended to yield a more equitable distribution of the burden of abatement (Klaasen 
[14]).  Figure 1 shows the substantial nature of these revisions:  
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Figure 1: 30% Club and New Protocol target abatement rates 
 
note that negative 30% Club targets mean that by 1990 the original 30% target had already been 
over-fulfilled.  Uniform percentage reductions in emissions by each country are potentially 
inefficient for a number of reasons: (1) the characteristics of emitting sources vary from country to 
country, so that emissions control opportunities and costs vary between countries; (2) 
environmental objectives are not explicitly taken into account in setting emissions reduction goals - 
these objectives may vary spatially because ecosystems are not uniformly assimilative of SO2 and 
NOx; (3) SO2 and NOx are non-uniformly mixing pollutants, i.e. the spatial pattern of depositions 
varies with the locational pattern of sources; (4) evaluation of damage caused by depositions varies 
across countries. 
In discussing emission reduction, it is necessary to make a distinction between primary and 
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secondary abatement.  By primary abatement, we mean the reduction of sulphur emissions by such 
means as: switching to low- or sulphur-free fuel;   reduced use of sulphurous fuel as a result of 
improved fuel efficiency in power stations; improved energy-efficiency in the rest of the economy; 
or any other measure reducing the output of electricity.  Secondary abatement involves the removal 
of sulphur from emissions during (e.g. by Fluidised Bed Combustion) or after (e.g. by Flue Gas 
Desulphurisation) burning the fuel, or removal (e.g. by washing) of sulphur before burning.  The 
targets of the New Protocol and the 30% Club do not specify which means should be adopted.  In 
this paper we are primarily concerned with the optimal pattern of secondary abatement, whose 
potential contribution to the targets can then be assessed and the role of primary abatement thus 
exposed.  The choice between primary and secondary abatement has recently been discussed in 
detail by Newbery [18], and may involve, for example, the choice between using locally mined high 
calorific but sulphurous coal, combined with retrofitted abatement equipment as in the Drax case 
cited, and building new gas-burning power stations. 
Mäler [16] and Halkos [8] have shown that for the costs of implementing the 30% Club 
target by secondary abatement, a 40% reduction in total emissions by allocating abatement 
expenditure to equalize marginal costs across the countries of Europe is possible. This "cost-
effectiveness" approach, however, runs into the same problems as the 30% Club in securing 
agreement and implementation, since the net benefits are unequally distributed, and could be 
negative for some countries like Britain where reduced depositions may be valued less than their 
increased abatement costs.  Nevertheless, the fact of the 30% Club Agreement points to the 
possibility of a more efficient agreement, which should be seen in the context of a wider set of 
issues on which countries seek agreement.  These other issues include trade policy, fisheries, river 
and coastal pollution, military expenditure and foreign aid;  for example, recent discussions within 
GATT have included the possibility of trade sanctions against countries with low abatement 
expenditure on the grounds of "unfair competition" (see [21]).  These countries may agree to 
cooperate to their own disadvantage over a single issue, so long as this helps achieve advantageous 
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agreement over other issues.  In turn, such multi-issue agreements may provide countries with the 
means to punish deviation by others by in turn deviating from individually disadvantageous 
agreements.   
In this paper we distinguish between two types of cooperative agreement.  The "social 
welfare" (henceforth SW) agreement can be viewed as an efficient version of the 30% Club, in that 
it seeks to achieve maximum aggregate net benefits, although these may be distributed unevenly and 
even yield negative net benefits for some countries.  In this latter event, "side-payments" to induce 
agreement are needed: such side-payments may not be financial, but could be in the form of 
compensating net benefits from agreement on other issues.  The complexity of such 
multinational/multi-issue bargaining need hardly be emphasized, however, which serves to 
demonstrate their utopian character (for discussion, see Andersson [4], Mäler [15, 16], Newbery 
[17] and Welsch [25]).   The second type of cooperative agreement we consider is more restrictive, 
but should be easier to achieve, since it requires that all countries achieve non-negative net benefits: 
 this is the Pareto-dominant (PD), or "no-loser" solution.  An objective of this paper is to quantify 
the costs of restricting the form of agreement to this second type, thus eliminating the need for side-
payments or collateral agreements. 
The benchmark against which to judge the benefits of cooperation is, of course, the status 
quo, which we take to be the "naive" non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, in which each country takes 
the policies of its neighbors as given, optimizing within that context.  The general principles of 
game theory in this sort of context are set out in [11], but there have been few empirical 
applications so far reported.  Mäler [15] provides a clear analysis of the "acid rain game" and some 
estimates of the gains from cooperation for European countries; Kaitala et al. [13] and Tahvonen et 
al. [20] model a dynamic game between Finland and four regions of the former USSR. We take 
Mäler’s study as our point of departure, and based on different data and model specification provide 
further numerical estimates of the potential benefits from cooperation and the potential role of 
secondary abatement in particular.  
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The essential steps in this form of study are as follows. First, for each country, one must 
determine abatement cost functions: these measure the cost of eliminating tones of SO2 from power 
stations' emissions, and will vary between countries depending on the existing power generation 
technology, and on the local costs of implementing best practice abatement techniques.  Full details 
of the abatement cost functions used here are reported in [7, 9] and summarized below in section 1. 
These control functions are based on research conducted by the Stockholm Environment Institute at 
York (SEIY) using information at the level of the individual power station; the International 
Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA, Austria) estimates are based on more aggregate data. 
 The IIASA functions are the basis of Mäler 's study, while Kaitala et al. [13] and Tahvonen et al. 
[20] use their own cost estimates, details of which are not known but which they compare with 
IIASA values. 
Second, one needs a matrix of transfer coefficients, indicating what proportions of 
emissions from any source country is ultimately deposited (in the form of acid rain) in any receiving 
country. For this purpose, we use the international matrix of 27x27 countries  derived by the 
European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (Norwegian Meteorological Institute), using 1990 as 
our base year  (see [6]).  
Third, damage functions are necessary.  The existing applied literature assumes that 
damage is a linear function of deposition (see [15, 16]).  The evidence of sensitivity maps (see [1, 
5]), however, strongly indicates that this is not valid, and that the damage function should be 
convex: depending on the local ecology, a succession of thresholds of tolerance to acidity results in 
increases in the marginal damage as the level of acidity increases.  Thus doubling the rate of 
deposition will more than double the damage caused. In common with other studies, we do not 
directly estimate the damage functions, but infer their parameters by assuming that countries 
currently equate national marginal damage cost with national marginal abatement cost, the latter 
being obtained from the cost functions described above. The assumed form of the damage function 
has quite far-reaching implications for the analysis, as we shall show. 
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2. Modeling optimal abatement 
We begin by defining the net benefit function for each country i as  
NBi = -(ACi + DCi),   
where ACi  is abatement cost and DCi is damage cost.  The abatement cost function is  
ACi  = ACi(SRi)  
where SRi is tones of sulphur removed from sulphur emissions Ei:  net emissions from country i are 
therefore given by the difference Ei - SRi.  These emissions are the byproduct of power generation 
and other uses of fuel, which we take as exogenous.  We later use empirical estimates of the ACi 
functions: these functions are convex, with ACi' > 0 and ACi'' > 0   i.   
The damage cost function depends on sulphur deposits, and is also country-specific: 
DCi = DCi(Di), 
where Di is tones of sulphur deposited in country i, and with DCi' > 0.  It is often assumed for 
empirical purposes that the damage function is linear (see e.g. Mäler [15,16] and Newbery [17]), 
while theoretical work assumes convexity i.e. DCi'' > 0 (see e.g. Welsch (op. cit.)).  We will use the 
convex assumption both for realism and because it permits policy interdependence, as discussed 
below.  
Deposits of sulphur in each country depend on the international transfer matrix H, where hij 
is the proportion of net emissions from country j which are deposited in i: these proportions are 
assumed fixed.  Country i also receives DiB, other background deposits (from the rest of the world, 
volcanos, etc).  Thus 
Di = Σj hij(Ej - SRj) + DiB. 
The damage function is therefore also convex in SR, and the net benefit function NBi concave in 
SRi. 
The status quo is modeled as the laissez-faire case of multilateral Nash equilibrium, with 
SR as the choice variable.  The i'th country maximizes NBi by choosing SRi to set marginal private 
net benefit to zero:  NBi/SRi = 0,   
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giving the reaction function discussed further below.   
In the SW maximization case, aggregate net benefit is maximized when each country sets 
marginal social net benefit to zero:  
ΣjNBj/SRi = 0  i.  
Since ACj/SRi = 0  ij, marginal social net benefit is given by  
NBi/SRi = -(ACi/SRi + ΣjDCj/SRi) 
hence the optimum is achieved by equating the individual marginal abatement cost to the aggregate 
marginal benefit.  Since marginal benefits are non-negative and marginal abatement costs 
increasing, it is clear that abatement is higher under SW maximization.  This is illustrated in the 
demand and supply diagram in Figure 2 below, in which marginal benefit (MB) is the negative of 
marginal damage cost, NSR is "Nash sulphur removed" and SWSR is "SW sulphur removed": with 
a linear damage function yielding constant marginal benefit (MB(L)), the SW outcome (SWSR(L)) 
is shown to be greater than that with diminishing marginal benefit.   
An increase in sulphur emissions in the rest of the world would shift the sloping MB lines 
to the right, resulting in more domestic abatement, while the horizontal MB(L) lines would not be 
affected: this illustrates how nonlinear damage functions are necessary to generate interdependent 
abatement policy.  Strict equalities in the above argument imply the assumptions that in the status 
quo all countries choose to incur some abatement cost (SRi > 0) and that the feasible upper limit of 
abatement is less than 100%, so that AC  as SR  E: an interior solution follows. Welsch (op. 
cit.) discusses the possibility that the non-negativity constraint binds at the optimum, but dismisses 
that case as a practical problem.   
Welsch establishes that the conditions for a SW equilibrium to exist are quite favorable, 
provided agreement on monitoring and on the measurement of abatement and damage costs can first 
be reached.  In such equilibrium cost-sharing would be essential since side-payments would be 
required to ensure that no country is a net loser relative to the Nash status quo.  As pointed out 
above, these side-payments might take the form of commitments on other issues also requiring 
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multilateral agreement. 
 
We wish to consider the case, however, where side-payments are ruled out: the reason for 
this is that the conditions for a SW equilibrium may be considered impossibly utopian, particularly 
since the damage costs of acid rain are highly uncertain and contentious  (see  [3, 17, 19, 22, 23]).  
A more reasonable objective is an agreement under which each country achieves at least the Nash 
benefit level, without having to agree levels of monetary compensation with all its neighbors to 
offset abatement and damage costs.  Monitoring would still be necessary to ensure physical 
emission limits were not exceeded, but this is relatively easy to establish.  Such equilibrium is the 
Pareto-dominant or "no-loser" case given by: 
Maximize ΣiNBi (SR)  
subject to NBi  NBi*   i 
where NBi* is the initial Nash benefit level, and SR = {SR1, SR2,....SRi,....} the set of abatement 
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levels.  The aggregate benefits achieved in this case will be less than in the SW case, and it is of 
interest to measure the potential gains relative to the polar Nash and SW cases.  We report our 
estimates below.   
The bilateral case 
Bilateral analysis allows a simple graphical representation of the different equilibrium 
concepts and the importance of nonlinear damage function.  Solution of the bilateral case will 
permit empirical comparison of partial cooperative gains with fully multilateral SW gains.  
Graphically, the different equilibrium outcomes are shown in Figure 3, in an Edgeworth box.  The 
proportional abatement coefficients α1 and α2 are plotted on the horizontal and vertical axes 
respectively: αi is defined as SRi/Ei. The isobenefit curves are the locuses of all points (α1, α2) that 
ensure different given levels of net benefits NB1 and NB2.  Since damage and abatement costs are 
convex in α1, α2 and in the deposits D1, D2, the isobenefit curves are represented as convex 
functions. R1 and R2 are the reaction functions and their intersection point N is the market or Nash 
equilibrium. B1 and B2 are the best achievable points. The curve joining B1 and B2 is the contract 
curve and in the region Nab both countries gain relative to the Nash solution.   The SW solution lies 
somewhere on the contract curve, and the Pareto dominant solution on the ab segment (at a or b if 
the SW solution would require side-payment). 
It is notable that the reaction functions are both negatively sloped, illustrating the 
interdependence of abatement levels: the more country A abates, the less country B abates.  This 
interdependence occurs because 2NBi/SRiSRj = -
2DCi/SRiSRj < 0: with linear damage 
functions the reaction functions are also linear and cross at a right angle.  
In this case, with negatively sloped reaction functions, the Von Stackelberg solution is 
another non-cooperative case that may be obtained from the problem: 
Maximize NB1 (SR1, SR2, DB1) 
   SR1,SR2                                    
subject to (/SR2)NB2(SR1, SR2, DB2) = 0 
         SRi  0 
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if country 1 is the Stackelberg leader, choosing α1 such that country 2, behaving in a Nash manner, 
chooses α2.  In general, the Stackelberg leader thereby improves net benefits relative to the Nash 
solution. The Stackelberg case is of some interest in the context of abatement control, modeling the 
situation where one country induces its neighbor to adopt higher abatement rates to reduce pollution 
imported from the first country: the first country benefits both from the lower abatement cost and 
from lower levels of pollution imported from the second. In Figure 2, S12 and S21 show the 
Stackelberg solutions, with 1 and 2 respectively as leaders. 
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3. The empirical study of European abatement 
Measurement and approximation of abatement cost functions   
The basic idea behind the derivation of cost functions is to find the least-cost abatement 
technologies for each country for any given level of sulphur abatement.  We here provide a brief 
account of the necessary procedures and assumptions1. 
To control sulphur-emissions the following abatement technologies, with different levels of 
costs and applicability (depending on the physical and chemical characteristics of the fuel used), 
exist in most industrialized countries: (a) gas oil desulphurization, (b) heavy fuel oil 
desulphurization, (c) hard coal washing, (d) in furnace direct limestone injection, (e) flue gas 
desulphurization and (f) fluidized bed combustion. The actual control costs of each abatement 
technology are defined by national circumstances and the abatement cost curves depend on the 
energy scenario adopted.  The abatement costs (per tone SO2 removed) will vary among countries as 
a result of country-specific factors such as sulphur content of fuels used, capacity utilization, size of 
installations and labor, electricity and construction cost factors.  In view of the differences between 
countries, with regard to both present and future energy demand, energy mix and fossil fuel 
qualities, the optimization must be carried out on a country-by-country basis. 
For every European country and for every plant in every sector an abatement cost curve 
may be derived which shows the least cost emission control function for each source. This means 
that for a country with n power plants, industrial boilers and petroleum refineries there would be n 
abatement cost curves. To produce a least cost curve for a country these curves are aggregated. This 
is done by finding the technology on the plant with the lowest marginal cost per tone of sulphur 
removed in the country and the amount of sulphur removed by that technology on that plant. This is 
the first step on the country curve. Iteratively the next highest marginal cost is found and is added to 
the country curve with the amount of sulphur removed on the X-axis. In the final national cost curve 
each step represents an abatement measure that achieves an emission reduction of an extra unit at 
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the least cost. The national cost curve consists of a large number of very small steps.  It should be 
noted that in a decentralised economy, the achievement of such minima may be prevented by the 
existence of taxes or by various forms of market failure, and intervention may be required to induce 
the private sector to minimize real resource costs.  
For analytical purposes, it is necessary to approximate the national cost curves by a 
functional form, at least over a relevant range spanning the range between current abatement levels 
and those implied by the international agreements. We found that least squares equations of the 
form  
ACi = a0i + a1iSRi + a2iSRi
2 
yield satisfactory approximations for all the countries analyzed in this paper2. Mäler [15, 16] and 
Kaitala et al. [13] also use quadratic approximations of the abatement cost functions; and Tahvonen 
[20] uses a piece-wise linear approximation.  
 
Damage cost function and its approximation 
The problem of estimating benefit functions (or equivalently damage functions)  is more 
difficult than the estimation of abatement costs, since the consequences of acidification cannot be 
identified with any certainty.  Damage depends on deposits, which depend on the [hij] matrix as 
shown above.  This matrix is measured using the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme 
(EMEP) transfer coefficient matrix, a basic instrument in all empirical models dealing with 
acid-rain problems [6].  
As already pointed out, the choice of restrictions on the derivatives of DCi(.) is important.  
Mäler [15, 16] and Newbery [17], although stating a preference for a convex damage function, 
assume a linear damage function with DCi' constant for all i, but we have chosen an alternative 
                                                                                                                                       
1 For more details on abatement cost function derivation, see Halkos [7,8,9] and Appendix III.  
2 Equations were fitted across the range 5-55% of maximum feasible abatement; constraining a1i to zero 
helped avoid negative abatement solutions. See Appendix II charts illustrating typical maximum feasible 
abatement.  
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approach. The total cost arising from a given level of sulphur emissions is, for country i,  
 TCi = abatement cost + damage cost = ACi + DCi.   
Cost of abatement is estimated by quadratic functions of sulphur removed, and we assume damage 
costs are also quadratic in deposits: 
TCi = [a0i + a1i SRi + a2i SRi
2] + [c1i Di + c2i Di
2]. 
It follows easily that total cost is minimized when  
c2i = [(a1i+2a2iSRi)/2hiiDi]- (c1i/2Di)   
This is the only information available to "calibrate" the damage function, on the assumption that 
national authorities act as Nash partners in a non-cooperative game with the rest of the world, 
taking as given deposits originating in the rest of the world.  If, like Mäler [15, 16] and Newbery 
[17], we set c2i=0, then c1i=(a1i+2a2iSRi)/hii, and total cost becomes  
TCi = [a0i + a1i SRi + a1i SRi
2] + [(a1i+2a2iSRi)/hii]Di   (i). 
We prefer to restrict c1i to zero and calibrate c2i as  c2i=(a1i+2a2iSRi)/2hiiDi  
yielding total costs of  
TCi = [a0i + a1i SRi + a1i SRi
2] + [(a1i+2a2iSRi)/2hii]Di   (ii) 
Comparing (i) and (ii), this choice obviously halves the implied total damage costs at the optimum; 
the positive second derivative means that the benefits from reductions in deposits will also be less 
than implied by a linear damage function, while the costs of additional deposits will be greater.   
The quadratic damage function also yields interdependence of policies, as discussed for the bilateral 
case above. 
 This “revealed preference” calibration procedure rests on strong assumptions: in each 
country it is assumed that abatement policy has been optimized so that marginal abatement cost 
equals marginal damage cost, the latter being somehow evaluated according to local conditions and 
attitudes. Such evaluations will depend as much on political and social considerations as on 
objective measures of physical damage. In this paper the importance of political change in Germany 
for damage function calibration is accordingly recognized.  
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The results of this paper depend on EMEP data, based on the old European boundaries. It is 
useful to work with this 'old data'. It does not make much sense to aggregate FRG and GDR simply 
for the sake of using current boundaries for the reason that policies in the two areas have historically 
been so different.  In our model, we have used different damage coefficients for FRG and GDR for 
the year 1990 and the FRG's damage coefficient for both countries for the year 2000 in an attempt 
to model their political union.  Similarly, the political evolution in the old USSR and 
Czechoslovakia is a political issue: as our calibration is based on the year 1990 it is necessary to 
treat these areas as political units even in 2000. 
Finally, the total annual sulphur emissions used here are based on research and projections 
conducted by IIASA for the years 1990 and 2000. The emissions for the year 1990 are net (i.e. after 
secondary abatement) while for the year 2000 are gross [2]. For 1990, we have estimated gross 
emissions using the current sulphur abatement level of European countries in 1990 (see Appendix 
III).  
4.  Numerical Results  
The discussion below is largely in terms of graphs: the numerical details may be found in 
Table A1.    
i. Initial vs SW Solutions for 1990 
Figure 4 compares the initial (actual) and computed SW abatement rates for all 27 countries and the 
average for Europe, based on IIASA data on sulphur emissions in 1990.  It is striking that both rates 
for FRG are quite similar, and very high, while for most other countries the SW rate considerably 
exceeds the actual, and in the cases of Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg very large increases are 
indicated.  Overall, the average SW abatement rate would more than double.  Aggregate costs for 
these scenarios are $1553.3m for Nash and $1527.0m for SW, the net gain of $26.3m being 
distributed as a mixture of gains and losses. In terms of quantities of sulphur removed from the 
atmosphere, the figures are more impressive: 832.0 thousand tones under Nash and 2124.0 
thousand tones under SW. 
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Figure 4: Abatement rates  
ii. Nash,  SW and Pareto Dominant Solutions for 2000 
 The results for the 2000 projections are summarized in Figure 5.  The Nash abatement rates 
are calculated as a base case, using the damage function parameterization obtained for 1990 in 
conjunction with emissions for 2000.  These Nash rates correspond to the initial rates in the 1990: 
they differ from the 1990 figures because different emission patterns for 2000 result in changed 
marginal damage costs which induce changed abatement rates.  The SW rates should be compared 
with the Nash rates to indicate uncompensated gains and losses from cooperation.  Finally, the 
Pareto rates are those which maximize SW with zero uncompensated losses.   
Table 1 summarizes the aggregate consequences of each regime in the year 2000.  About 
one-third of the monetary measure of gains from SW maximization is lost in the Pareto dominant 
case, but in terms of tones of sulphur, the difference is proportionately much greater.  The aggregate 
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gain from full cooperation is, however, only about 2% of total costs, although average abatement 
rises from 5% to 11%.  The balance of total costs shifts from the damage to the abatement 
component. 
Figure 5: Optimal abatement rates 
 
Table 1:  Alternative solutions for the year 2000: Main Aggregates 
Regime Costs and Gains from 
Cooperation (US$m) 
Sulphur Removed 
(thousand tones) 
Nash  2113.2 1438.4 
SW 
 (i) Total 
 (ii) Difference from Nash 
 
2068.7 
44.5 
 
3146.1 
1707.7 
Pareto Dominant 
 (i) Total 
 (ii) Difference from Nash 
 
2082.6 
30.6 
 
2153.6 
715.2 
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Figure 6 shows the distribution of gains and losses under SW and PD.  Under SW, 17 out 
of 27 countries gain without the need for side-payments, but in the PD solution their gains are 
reduced substantially.  Belgium, USSR, Czechoslovakia and UK are the biggest losers, while 
Denmark, Finland, France, GDR, FRG, Netherlands and Switzerland are the biggest gainers from 
SW.   As already noted, in this scenario, we treat today's Germany as GDR and FRG separately for 
abatement cost purposes but with the same damage function coefficient.  Even with the major 
redistribution of benefits under PD, FRG and GDR are still the main beneficiaries.  The figures for 
FRG dominate the results.  The reason for this is that in 1990 FRG was by a large margin the 
biggest abater, and this fact is reflected in Germany's damage function coefficient and thus in the 
optimal abatement pattern for all Europe: any country whose emissions form any significant 
component of Germany's deposits is induced in both the SW and PD case to increase its abatement 
rates, reducing both damage cost and abatement cost for Germany. 
 
Figure 6: Gains and losses 
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iii. Bilateral examples 
The table below illustrates the difference between full multilateral and bilateral cooperation. 
   The case of FRG and GDR is interesting because of their political union: the results show that 
GDR loses in each case, but the multilateral loss (relative to Nash) is much greater; by contrast, 
FRG's multilateral gains are much greater than bilateral gains.  Thus both gain from the extra 
abatement of their neighbors, while GDR also incurs significantly greater abatement costs in the 
multilateral case.  Bilateral negotiation between UK and FRG, however, yield trivial gains in total, 
FRG being the gainer; but even in the multilateral case, the UK is much less affected than FRG.  
The reason is that the UK gains little from others' abatement, while its relatively high marginal cost 
of abatement prevents a large absolute increase in abatement (although the abatement rate increases 
sharply proportionately).  The third pair, Austria and Italy, shows a small gain from bilateral 
cooperation, but both lose from higher abatement costs under multilateral cooperation: the 
significance of this example is that such a pair might easily negotiate a bilateral agreement but 
would require generous side-payments from a multilateral agreement, intrinsically more difficult to 
negotiate.  For these three pairs, the Stackelberg solutions are very close to the Nash solutions, and 
are therefore not reported separately: this demonstrates the small degree of policy interdependence 
in the bilateral case, since an individual neighbor has much less effect than the collection of all 
neighbors. 
Table 2: Total cost ($m) and kilotons of sulphur removed (Kt) in Nash, bilateral social welfare 
(Bil SW) and multilateral social welfare (Mul SW) 
 
Country 
Nash 
$m 
Nash 
Kt 
Bil SW 
$m 
Bil SW 
Kt 
Mul SW 
$m 
Mul 
SW Kt 
GDR 
FRG 
TOTAL 
103.92 
419.88 
523.80 
24.24 
340.34 
364.58 
107.0 
413.7 
520.7 
124.52 
339.92 
464.44 
109.42 
392.06 
501.48 
163.46 
372.69 
536.15 
FRG 
UK 
TOTAL 
419.88 
118.44 
538.32 
340.34 
19.06 
359.40 
418.9 
118.93 
537.83 
340.31 
47.45 
387.76 
392.06 
120.01 
512.07 
372.69 
73.31 
446.0 
Austria 
Italy 
TOTAL 
  6.71 
112.3 
119.01 
8.57 
11.01 
19.58 
6.7 
112.3 
118.98 
9.16 
12.42 
21.58 
6.93 
112.55 
119.48 
31.1 
41.73 
72.83 
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iv. Primary vs secondary abatement in 2000 and the New Protocol 
To infer the contributions of primary and secondary abatement to the New Protocol targets, 
we compare the target abatement rates with SW optimal secondary rates.  Target less SW optimal 
secondary provides an estimate of the required primary contribution, in the form of an abatement 
deficit.  This estimate will be biased downward; however, since the SW rates are computed for 
IIASA gross emission projections for 2000: high levels of primary abatement, such as fuel-
switching, would reduce gross emissions, resulting in lower secondary abatement rates in our model. 
 The residual role for primary abatement is nevertheless very high.  Figure 7 shows that primary 
abatement must contribute more than 80% of total abatement, and that for most countries major 
primary programs will be required. Turkey, Switzerland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Greece and 
Albania appear to be the only countries with relatively modest primary abatement requirements; the 
feasibility of the targets for the rest of Europe must be in question. 
There are technical, political and economic obstacles to high levels of primary abatement.  
Among the technical issues are the low calorific value and the ash characteristics of low sulphur 
coal affecting the operation of electrostatic precipitators.  Politically, there are many problems such 
as resistance to the substitution of imports for domestic fuel, environmental concerns surrounding 
nuclear power and employment effects in coal-mining communities. Finally, in Eastern Europe, 
where many of the greatest changes are required and serious economic problems have arisen, 
retrofitting of secondary abatement equipment to old generators may be impracticable, and the costs 
would amount to 1-2% of GDP compared with no more than 0.4 % for all Europe.  It may be 
necessary that Western Europe provides some form of aid to ensure achievement of agreed targets. 
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Figure 7: Comparative abatement rates for 2000 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
i. The "30% Club" sulphur abatement targets for 2000 have recently been substantially 
revised, mainly upward, and will require major programs of fuel switching or other 
methods to reduce consumption of sulphur fuels. 
ii. Fully cooperative secondary abatement policy would reduce total abatement plus damage 
costs for 2000 by about 2%, and would result in a 6% reduction in sulphur deposits.  In the 
absence of any mechanism to assess and ensure side-payments, maximum cost savings are 
reduced to about 1.5% and deposits reductions are reduced to about 3% in the Pareto-
dominant solution. These figures are considerably smaller than those reported by Mäler 
[15], but caution is needed in comparing solutions. Mäler’s study was based on much lower 
IIASA projected gross emissions for 2000 than ours’ (11,522 vs 27,745 kilotons); the 
 
 
 22 
EMEP data have been revised to attribute greater tonnage to sea and unidentified 
destinations - our calibrations are based on 1990 data, while Mäler’s are based on 1984; 
for 11 out of Mäler’s 26 countries, “full cooperative” abatement (corresponding to our 
SW) is constrained at the maximum feasible, while we find internal solutions for all cases; 
and Mäler’s use of linear damage functions will tend to produce both greater levels of 
abatement and greater damage cost estimates. Mäler shows tonnage of sulphur abated at 
4500 kilotons (i.e. 9011 kt. Of SO2), compared to our 3146 kilotons, representing 39% and 
11% average abatement rates respectively. The greatest difference, however, is in the 
monetary benefits estimates: we estimate maximum benefits at $45m, whereas Mäler’s 
figure is DM6248m ($2000m approximately).    Mäler’s estimates of marginal damage 
must be larger than ours.  Newbery [17] also reports figures similar to Mäler’s using a 
different methodology for damage estimation, with 30% average abatement or about 3400 
kilotons of sulphur. In interpreting these figures, it is essential to recognize that Mäler’s 
and Newbery’s results are independent of the total level of projected emissions, so that 
their tonnage figures may be compared with ours’ while the abatement rates are not 
comparable: this is because of their use of  linear damage functions. Results for abatement 
tonnage under full cooperation are therefore broadly similar, whereas benefit estimates are 
very different         
iii. Germany dominates the picture in Europe: as its initial abatement level is high its 
calibrated damage function ensures continuing high levels of abatement and measured 
costs.  The union of FRG and GDR is shown to redistribute the costs of this policy in favor 
of FRG. 
iv. Bilateral cooperation is studied for a few countries: since some pairs (e.g. Austria and 
Italy) can conclude advantageous bilateral agreements but have uncompensated losses from 
multilateral agreements, it is clear that the level of side-payments needed to sustain the 
latter must yield positive net gains.  The Pareto-dominant solution would require a similar 
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condition.  Although of theoretical interest, the Stackelberg solutions where one country 
assumes the role of leader in a bilateral game were of no practical interest in the cases 
studied. The formation of coalitions intermediate between non-cooperation and full 
multilateral cooperation is a possible response to the pervasive free-rider  problems 
attending any attempt  at full cooperation; and Heal [10] shows that in the presence of 
fixed costs of membership, the optimum size of coalition may be less than the total number 
of possible participants.  
v. In the absence of cooperation, the abatement rates predicted for 2000 are similar to those 
for 1990, with the exceptions of the two Germanys and Austria.  The revised 
parameterization for 2000 induces an equalization of the burden of abatement between East 
and West Germany; this benefits Austria by reducing its deposits from the old GDR, so 
that Austria reduces its own abatement rate.  The overall effect is to increase average 
abatement from 4% in 1990 to 5% in 2000.  The Austria effect noted here illustrates the 
interdependence resulting from the assumption of a non-linear damage function. 
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Appendices 
I Table A1  Summary of results: abatement rates, costs and gains. 
Countries initabate sw1990 nash2000 sw2000 pareto2000 swtc swgains paretotc pgains np2000 30%2000 
Albania 1 2 1 2 2 0.90 0.029 0.90 0.010 21 57 
Austria 16 41 6 20 16 12.16 -0.214 11.90 0.056 80 30 
Belgium 1 21 1 25 4 12.65 -9.430 3.20 0.020 68 2 
Bulgaria 1 6 1 10 2 1.96 -0.271 1.70 0.007 67 53 
Czechos 3 7 3 11 8 92.42 -2.550 89.80 0.060 66 14 
Denmark 10 13 9 12 12 36.08 2.930 37.10 1.910 77 -23 
Finland 3 4 3 3 3 33.20 2.084 34.60 0.672 73 6 
France 5 10 6 12 12 153.12 4.060 157.10 0.052 49 -77 
GDR 1 6 34 43 44 331.72 6.080 335.80 1.996 91 20 
FRG 42 44 30 35 35 568.34 37.330 584.70 20.940 81 19 
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 25.35 0.354 25.60 0.084 35 70 
Hungary 1 3 1 2 2 26.98 0.343 27.10 0.200 66 25 
Ireland 1 5 1 5 2 1.40 -0.092 1.30 0.012 44 34 
Italy 1 4 1 3 2 120.90 -0.325 120.50 0.033 67 14 
Luxemb. 5 23 6 42 18 1.40 -0.381 0.97 0.015 28 -20 
Nether. 15 26 14 30 31 64.72 5.289 68.80 1.200 65 -7 
Norway 5 8 3 5 5 11.20 0.901 11.70 0.410 73 21 
Poland 1 3 1 4 3 101.20 0.137 101.30 0.005 67 31 
Portugal 1 2 1 1 1 11.80 0.091 11.90 0.006 19 49 
Romania 1 2 1 2 2 49.50 0.401 49.80 0.160 67 61 
Spain 1 7 1 6 1 97.13 -1.272 95.80 0.030 61 39 
Sweden 7 12 4 7 7 15.43 1.200 16.10 0.602 79 13 
Switzer. 7 10 7 10 10 37.48 2.791 38.30 1.980 28 -5 
Turkey 2 2 2 2 2 58.51 0.489 58.90 0.135 11 81 
USSR 5 16 4 16 7 17.13 -2.861 14.30 0.007 57 40 
UK 1 4 1 4 2 125.94 -2.557 123.40 0.020 76 19 
Yugosl. 1 4 1 3 3 60.11 0.028 60.10 0.001 58 62 
Ave/total 4 10 5 11 8 2069.00 45.000 2083.00 31.000   
 
Note:  
initabate=initial % abatement rate; sw1990, sw2000 = SW % rates for 1990, 2000; nash2000= nash % rate 
for 2000; pareto2000= PD % rate for 2000; swtc = SW total costs for 2000; swgains, pgains = Nash total cost 
less swtc and PD total costs; np2000 = New Protocol % rate for 2000; 30%2000 = 30% Cluc % rate for 
2000. 
 
 
II  Abatement cost curve comparisons 
 
The marginal cost curves for the 27 European countries in the year 2000 presented in Halkos [7,9]  
can be divided into two main groups of countries: those for which new cost values are always higher 
than IIASA's (e.g. Greece, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, France, FRG, Portugal, U.K.) and those 
which present a "mixed" evidence, i.e. for some portions of the curves IIASA is more expensive, or 
vice-versa (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey). As a 
representative example of each case the marginal abatement cost curves for the UK and Austria 
follow. 
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III Current levels of abatement  
 
The cost curves derived in our model represent a "hypothetical" situation, as far 
as they assume that countries apply a number of technologies for each fuel used and in 
the most cost-effective way.  However, the reality is different. In this section, the current 
level of abatement (if any) in each European country is presented in Table A2. Table A3 
presents the number of control units installed in each European country (if there are any) 
at the end of 1989.  The first column represents the number of units that are retrofitted 
and their total capacity (in MWe), the second column gives the same information but for 
new installations and the third column gives the totals (i.e. number of retrofitted and new 
units and their total capacity).  
 
 
Table A2:  Levels of abatement reductions and proposals (in 1000 t) 
 
Countries 
1989  
level  
 
(%) 
post 1990 
Addition  
 
(%) 
post 1990 
Total 
 
(%) 
 
Austria 
 
29 
 
15.51 
 
5.31 
 
2.84 
 
34.31 
 
18.35 
 
Belgium 
 
2.482 
 
0.8 
 
1.635 
 
0.5 
 
4.117 
 
1.3 
 
Denmark 
 
14.18 
 
9.92 
 
18.565 
 
12.98 
 
32.745 
 
22.9 
 
Finland 
 
8.139 
 
3.0 
 
10.601 
 
4.0 
 
18.74 
 
7.0 
 
France 
 
1.945 
 
0.25 
 
1.418 
 
0.2 
 
3.363 
 
0.45 
 
FRG 
 
651.7 
 
41.9 
 
49.82 
 
3.2 
 
701.5 
 
45.1 
 
Italy 
 
3.422 
 
0.2 
 
139.56 
 
8.2 
 
142.98 
 
8.4 
 
Netherlands 
 
34.989 
 
14.46 
 
15.215 
 
6.3 
 
50.204 
 
20.76 
 
Spain 
 
0.06 
 
.0023 
 
7.013 
 
0.27 
 
7.073 
 
0.272 
 
Sweden 
 
8.419 
 
3.4 
 
0.973 
 
0.4 
 
9.392 
 
3.8 
 
UK 
 
7.236 
 
0.4 
 
198.975 
 
10.8 
 
206.211 
 
11.2 
 
Turkey 
 
- 
 
- 
 
37.13 
 
1.7 
 
37.13 
 
1.7 
 
Czechoslovakia 
 
26.422 
 
2.2 
 
16.985 
 
1.4 
 
43.407 
 
3.6 
 
GDR 
 
15.083 
 
0.72 
 
- 
 
- 
 
15.083 
 
0.72 
 
Ireland 
 
0.357 
 
0.43 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.357 
 
0.43 
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Table A3: Number of units and capacity of SO2 control equipment currently in use (end 1989) 
Countries Retrofitted 
No 
Units 
MWe 
New 
No  
Installations 
MWe 
Totals 
No 
MWe 
 
Austria 
 
5 
 
600 
 
14 
 
1449 
 
19 
 
2049 
 
Belgium 
 
- 
 
- 
 
11 
 
201 
 
11 
 
201 
 
Denmark 
 
1 
 
350 
 
6 
 
630 
 
7 
 
980 
 
Finland 
 
3 
 
540 
 
31 
 
430 
 
34 
 
970 
 
France 
 
- 
 
- 
 
19 
 
1005 
 
19 
 
1005 
 
FRG 
 
158 
 
36300 
 
65 
 
5255 
 
223 
 
41555 
 
Italy 
 
- 
 
- 
 
4 
 
245 
 
4 
 
245 
 
Netherlands 
 
5 
 
2732 
 
2 
 
31 
 
7 
 
2763 
 
Spain 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Sweden 
 
12 
 
683 
 
61 
 
752 
 
73 
 
1435 
 
UK 
 
- 
 
- 
 
131 
 
389 
 
131 
 
389 
 
Ireland 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2 
 
24 
 
2 
 
24 
 
GDR 
 
1 
 
250 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1 
 
250 
 
Czechoslovakia 
 
4 
 
400 
 
- 
 
- 
 
4 
 
400 
Sources:  IEA Coal Research [12]; Vernon [24];  IEA Coal Research: personal communication 
 
 
 
